Network Studies (part four)

Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Science of Networks
Mark Buchanan

Against Essentialism: A Theory of Culture and Society
Stephan Fuchs

No editing done.

Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Science of Networks
Mark Buchanan

Prelude

Complexity theory–In an abstract sense, an collection of interacting parts–from atoms and molecules to bacteria, pedestrians, traders on a stock market floor, and even nations–represents a kind of substance. Regardless of what it is made of, that substance satisfies certain laws of form, the discovery of which is the aim of complexity theory (18).

The prelude covers a lot of ground that I’ve covered with my other readings in this area. At one point Buchanan explains:

As we will see, there is a kind of innate intelligence in these network structures, almost as if they had been finely crafted and laid out by the hand of some divine architect. Scientist are only beginning to understand where this intelligence comes from, how it can arise quite naturally, and most of all, how we might learn from it. (20)

This makes me think about the ideas I’ve gleaned from other texts on this list. Is it less that’s there’s a divine architect (and I’m sure Buchanan is only being hyperbolic at this point), but that each node only does localized work without having to be aware of the larger, global outcome? Barabasi claims nodes only need immediate gratification to continue performing the same action repeatedly (and this gratification can come in any form, from pleasure to efficiency to survival), while Latour would say one node is being coerced into action by another node (the mediator role). Does there need to be an innate, grander scheme? Is it possible to move from a unifying theory to a localizing theory?

Chapter Two The Strength of Weak Ties

Random graphs fail to explain the small-world phenomenon unless they factor in weak ties. Without accounting for weak ties, the only thing random graphs display is the clustering that occurs between nodes with strong ties. Weakly tied nodes often form the bridges to other networks; since they are not as intensely bonded to small cluster “A” (an etended family, a group of church parishioners) they have ties to other networks they do consider close confidantes. “Without weak ties, a community would be fragmented into a number of isolated cliques” (46).

Against Essentialism: A Theory of Culture and Society
Stephan Fuchs

Introduction

In the intro it appears Fuchs is pitching a new type of sociology–the sociology of culture. In this version of sociology, society is seen more as a network with nodes being the outcomes of networks. This new sociology is built on a combination of antifoundational positivism, pragmatism, and constructivism (full explanation on 8). In this system of networks humanism and agency metaphysics are overcome with a strong move toward relationalism (hence, networks). In this version of sociology “‘[p]ersons’ are not the source or origin of society; rather they are outcomes of some networks, but not others” (8) as they’re the nodes in the networks.

Key points that resonate with other readings, or put a new spin on them:

• Networks are dynamic, they fluctuate and change.
• An individual nodes relations with other nodes within a given network define what that first mentioned individual node “is.”  It’s identity is given to it by the network it exists within; if changes networks, then its identity changes.
• Networks actually exist at different levels; some are embedded within others. Small nodes are groups and embedded within organizations, and these organizations house encounters which occur between groups. Organization are not as orderly as they appear–they must expend tons of energy to keep these groups contained, speaking to one another, and give the appearance that they’re all part of a unified front. Organizations provide purpose and the construct of unity. (Think Collin and the talk about the discipline, coupled with a Fuchs talk about Science with a capital “S” on page 6).

Chapter One Theory After Essentialism

Fuchs explains a sociological theory of culture and science moves from essentialism by using the opposite strategy of relationalism.   This, coupled with a network concept of how society and science works, moves away from an idea of absolutes and closer to the idea of variation–things are not different in kind but in degree.  Localized interactions make things happen, not an overarching grand design and goal worked towards by the individual nodes within the network (16).   As observers come out of different networks to analysis another network (the second level in Fuchs’ scheme) they bring with them pracitces and ideas that shape the unstructured reality of the network of nodes working in a localized scheme (nodes work only towards immediate gratification not towards nor under some theoretical goal); the observer assigns purpose and boundaries to groups and organizations.  Purpose is provided by these constructs, and observers/scholars from within groups (which if large enough coalsce to the size of organizations) perform the same work in house to provide identity, purpose, and therefore, unity to organizations.

Observers can be human and non-human, affiliated with an academic discipline or nodes living performing their work within the work-net.  Observers make sense of unstructured reality and either a) report back to their network/discipline their observations or b) use their observations to their immediate benefit.  For Fuchs, the important piece is that when that observer dies or her information is no longer shared within her disciplinary work-net, the information and view of unstructured reality goes disappears.

All practices in society/organization/discipline/network are fluid; all the boundaries and practices of the networks are fluid and changing.  When a network (and again this means society/organization/discipline) is allowed to work within a system of variation and gradation, artifacts or concepts often seen as fixed or oppositional within that worknet are seen as products of their relations to other nodes (artifacts/concepts) within a network.  There are no essential qualities that make the nature of the nodes different, therefore:

There are difference in degree just the same, such as in scale, size, range, and diversity of of networks.  These are differences in degree, not kind, and allowing for variation both between and within networks makes the search for “essentially modern,” as opposed to the “essentially traditional,” vacuous and pointless.  (52)

When networks see themselves as closed off and above reflexivity, it’s merely the outcome of feeling sure of an identity; the network is in a period of stability.  This is only a type of mental gymnastics.  Network are always in flux, one thing is becoming something else in accordance with its position to other nodes within the network.  Things are not evolving, only adapting.

Chapter Two How to Sociologize with a Hammer

Fuchs continues his explanation of variation as the key to a sociology of culture and science.  In this chapter Fuchs explains how using variation gets around the troubling issues of metaphysics and dualism; variation does away with both.

[W]e do not need a new metaphysics to overcome essentialism and dualism if we make full use of the sociological arsenal.  In fact, a new metaphysics does not solve any problems, but simple displaces them to another level, such as the middle kingdom of collectives of quasi-objects.  Instead, once we allow for variation, we can observe nature and society, subject and object, persons and things, interpretation and explanation, or hermneutics and science as the poles in a continuum of social attribtuion and construction.  (110)

Much like Latour, Fuchs is espousing the virtues of sociology and explaining how a revamped sociology can make a substantial difference in how knowledge is made and how that knowledge is utilized.

Chapter Three Cultural Rationality

Variation is applied to rationality to demonstrate that rationality is not found within an actor who uses her agency to act rationally.  Rationality is the not the cause of any one thing but is contingent upon the network of forces an actant exists within; the actants relation to other nodes within the network shapes the actants choices.  Rationality is not a universal constant, it is something that exists only in network where unstructured reality has been simplified, easily quantifiable, and is the choice that appears most efficient and profitable using this simplified take on experiential reality.

In sum, rationality is a variable, not a constant.  It is a mode of observing and communicating about action, not a natural property of acting itself.  Rationality prospers when the relevant world has been simplified and quantified, concentrating the attention space on a small and domesticated set of well understood variables and parameters.  (137)

I would like to stress, however, none of this makes Fuchs a postmodernist.  He deplores the idea of such a position as the dichotomous opposite of the modernist tradition (or, if you like, use the terms foundationalist and anti-foundationalist).  Both are essentialized, hardened positions that do not allow for variance–the key to his project of a creating a new and better sociology.

Chapter Four Foundations of Culture

This chapter explains how the what is traditionally considered a cultural artifact–Art (capital “A” intended) for example–has no essential quality.  The system which exists within a society, the one composed of critics, artists, scholars, and academics and deals with “Art,” decides what art is through their designations of an  object as such.  The closer such an artifact is to the center of such a network, the smaller chance this object will fall out of favor as art when the network adapts and changes.  These observations are made from the second level, meaning the questions asked when making these distinctions are not “why” questions but “how” questions.   Fuchs also covers other designations such as genius (187), author (185), and ideas (139) in this chapter, to0; and like art, they follow the same patterns.

Chapter Five Modes of Association I: Encounters, Groups, and Organizations

This chapter goes through and explains how each of the three designations above are nested–one into the other.  What this means breaks down something like this: encounters happen between individuals; if the encounters happen regularly, this usually leads to the formation of groups who use these encounters as the  basis for their group; groups often occur within organizations (grad schools, corporations, professional organizations, firms, etc) since the organization gives the groups a shared meeting place and a shared social world where several individuals can meet and communicate.  As in all the other chapters, there is a de-emphasizing of postmodern skepticism and a constant refrain against seeing individual nodes within networks as “people” or more importantly, an individual node as a “person” as defined by liberal humanist thought and tradition (also, “liberal” does not connect in any way, shape, or form to the current US political spectrum.  Think James Berlin and his talk about the academy in the 19th century).

The emphasis here, again, is on variation.  To go with humanist thought means to parse things down to essential qualities where no change is possible; to work with postmodernist/post-structuralist thought means to bog down into philosophical discussions about agency and the iron cages of bureaucracy.  Neither in Fuchs estimation allows for second level observations (asking “how” questions) and moves the observers eyes away from the seeing things in terms of networks.  The use of networks as a  conceptual model for human interaction demystifies how society and the organizations within it work and shape and produce individuals.

Emotions as the appropriate way to communicate to a larger network 197.

Turbulence 210.

Technology 221.

Social Movements 222.

Centrality 248.

Looming large in this chapter is the talk of “front stage” versus “backstage.”  As the names suggest, there is the public and the private face, but in this text there is also a discussion about how the front stage is important not only for unaffiliated nodes and groups moving in other organizations, but also for those groups and nodes which are affiliated with a specific organization (lets call it  “Org A”).  Front stage space gives purpose and identity to the nodes and groups found in Org A.  If the core of Org A becomes weak, then the backstage and front stage areas are markedly different. While the front stage area is still filled with official proclamations of what Org A believes is its overall goal, the backstage is filled with gossip, critique, and articulated statements questioning if the goals of Org A  are possible.  Fuchs, as he has in the rest of the book, argues that this often occurs only in organizations where the center is fluctuating (as in a paradigm shift) or exceptionally weak and nearing death.  Also, as can be found in other chapters of this book, Fuchs stresses this happens in academic disciplines which are oftentimes young, or enamored with postmodern critiques of knowledge production, or unstable due to its position in relation to other disciplines within the academy.

Modes of Social Association II: Networks

This chapter describes the life cycles of networks, how nodes become cores, and how cores develop institutions to lengthen the core’s, and therefore the network’s, life span.  While my explanation may appear very conspiracy theory, Fuchs does explain why the core must exist explaining:

The core contains that which is taught to new generations as unproblematic and established fact.  It includes Kuhnian exemplars, textbooks, demonstration experiments with predictable outcomes, and bureaucratic examination or grading rituals…cores do not consider the possibility that there might be a world in which the core no longer applies.  This unwillingness or inability to learn, however, is itself a condition for learning, especially for cumulative advances, since learning occurs only if not everything changes at the same time.  If it does, there is not progress but breakdown. (286, 287)

Since networks are often needed to navigate and make sense of the unstructured reality of the world, the core is allowed to do this type of work since it benefits the individual nodes of the network.  It’s efficient and provides tangible benefits for the nodes revolving around a particular core.  As Barabasi points out, nodes within a network (and here nodes could be webpages linking to a search engine, or the organelle of a cell) adhere to a specific setup since it benefits them; it gratifies them; provides sustenance; or even means basic survival.  In the more academic sense, the core also produces the methodologies used to create new knowledge.  While this statement may seem redundant when compared to what’s written above, it is important to stress this since this means for a set of nodes within a given network these approved methodologies are real and binding–their survival depends on it.

For an observer, or someone looking to challenge these methodologies from within, this amounts to understanding not to attack the work of the network, but its methods as being untrue to accepted methodologies.  Nodes in networks only understand information presented in ways deemed acceptable by the core.  To challenge, say the work of early 19th century anthropology and make it mean something for anthropologists now, means a dissident would be better off challenging the data or the methods in juxtaposition to the stated methodology supposedly guiding a 19th century anthropologist’s work then claiming, wholesale, that all work from this time period is merely scientific racism.  Networks, and the organizations they help create, only understand information (whether it be directly from the experiential world or a critic) which looks like something they would produce.  Methodologies are not fictions, but appropriate sets of mental gymnastics to make something Science or Art or Music or Rhetoric (capital letters intended).  There is no essential quality making an object the output of any of the listed networks, nor is it absolutely true (nor empowering) to think of every criteria set forth by these disciplines as unfounded fictions made up by the elite of each discipline to merely protect their positions.

Cores can, however, overextend and kill a network.

Cores might also decay from overextension or stagnation, thereby turning success into failure.  As a core swallows larger and larger parts of the network, this network no longer generates interesting, or non-routine, puzzles.  Its nodes and links become brittle with age, and the entire structure “freezes” in the winter of a dying civilization.  (292)

Cores become cores not through any essential property, but through redundant and multiple links to a small number of nodes.  The ability to so closely knit allows for a type of clique to form where theories, ideas, and worldviews become things beyond examination.  The values, beliefs, ideas, theories, and worldviews of the core become absolute truth and transcendental–they describe reality as it really is, have evolved from disorder in an orderly and teleological fashion, and are protected from shocks and turbulence through various buffers of dogma and bureaucracy surrounding the core.  The outlying nodes within the network, usually further out from the core but still well-connected to the core, is where all dynamic, sacrilegious, cutting-edge work occurs.  This work is often performed by those designated “stars” within the network, and since these stars reputations travel through the links of the network, they are often recognized as such throughout the entire network.  This work is still forced to conform to genre/discipline specific styles of transmission and must be explainable by the core principles in some “essential” sense.

Chapter Seven Realism Explained

For Fuchs realism means “externalization and attribution of a network’s outcomes not to the network, but to the world itself, or that part of the world which constitutes the network’s referential niche” (296).  Realism is also the device used by networks to “curb or prohibit second-order observing” (296), ie, asking “how” questions, as a way to stop the interrogation of a network’s core beliefs.  The rest of the chapter is demonstrating realism by juxtaposing realist networks to constructivist networks; in the end the ultimate realist networks are the ones which constitute the hard sciences, while the most constructivist are the networks which form the humanities.

In Ward’s terms, realist cultures develop a “logical” as opposed to “rhetorical mode of operation.  A strong emphasis on logic, codification, and consistent conceptual closure with “minimal authorial self-reference” is the mark of secure institutional embedding.  Meaning is more likely literal than ifgurative or metaphorical.  When meaning becomes “purely symbolic,” disassociated from things and objects, a “rhetorical” mode emerges, signaling much weaker authority.  (299)